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INTRODUCTION
On Saturday, April 25, 1942, 852 people from the German city of
Würzburg and its environs boarded trains heading east under armed guard.
The passengers had been forced from their homes because they were Jewish.
They had already lost much of their property to rapacious neighbors. They
had been allowed to take with them to the train station only what they could
carry. At their destination they faced confinement.1
The next day, Sunday, April 26, 1942, almost 6,000 miles away, a group
of 800 people from the American city of Santa Monica boarded buses heading
east under armed guard.2 They had been forced from their homes because
they were of Japanese ancestry. They too had already lost much of their

* © 2021 Eric L. Muller.
** Dan K. Moore Distinguished Professor in Jurisprudence and Ethics, University of North
Carolina School of Law.
1

This deportation is described and photographically depicted in STAATLICHE ARCHIVE
BAYERNS, WEGE IN DIE VERNICHTUNG. DIE DEPORTATION DER JUDEN AUS MAINFRANKEN
1941-1943 (2003). It is also described in Eric L. Muller, Of Nazis, Americans, and Educating
Against Catastrophe, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 323, 330–32 (2012).
2

Japanese Exodus from Los Angeles Goes Forward, L.A. TIMES, April 28, 1942.
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property to rapacious neighbors. They too had been allowed to take with them
only what they could carry. At their destination they too faced confinement.
I am anxious as I draw this analogy between the World War II
deportations of German Jews and Japanese Americans.3 The enormity and
mechanization of the Nazi genocide dwarf anything placed alongside it. The
abjectness of Nazi evil and the scope of Jewish suffering eclipse everything
in their shadows. To compare anything to the Holocaust invites the prompt
and derisive accusation of reductio ad Hitlerum that is so effective at ending
discussion.4
This anxiety has stalked academic and popular discussion of the wartime
removal and imprisonment of Japanese Americans for decades. While
community activists and scholars have succeeded in establishing this
program as one of America’s biggest civil rights violations rather than the
justified military measure most Americans deemed it during and after the
war,5 one strategy has repeatedly encountered resistance. It is a linguistic
strategy. During the war, many people in the United States referred to the
government’s ten confinement sites for Japanese Americans as
“concentration camps.” Today, for most Americans, the term “concentration
camp” calls up images of Auschwitz.6 Seeking to strip the Japanese American
camps of any veneer of pleasantness, advocates and scholars have
increasingly come to call them “concentration camps” rather than the
euphemistic “assembly centers” and “relocation centers” of government

3

In this Essay I will refer to the affected group as “Japanese Americans,” even though that
is technically an incorrect (or at least incomplete) description. Roughly one third of those
affected were not American nationals; they were Japanese resident aliens. See WAR
RELOCATION AUTHORITY, THE EVACUATED PEOPLE: A QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION 96
(1946).
4

LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 42 (1953).

5

Gallup Vault: WWII-Era Support for Japanese Internment, GALLUP (Aug. 31, 2016),
https://news.gallup.com/vault/195257/gallup-vault-wwii-era-support-japaneseinternment.aspx.
6

Auschwitz, in what is now southern Poland, operated between 1940 and 1945 as the largest
of the German concentration camps and extermination centers. See Auschwitz, HOLOCAUST
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/auschwitz.
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parlance.7 And this effort to restore the common colloquial usage has
triggered periodic waves of conflict with people who see it as an attempt to
establish a false and insulting equivalence.
Today the conflict stands largely, even if still a bit uncomfortably,
resolved. Those who call the Manzanar Relocation Center8 or the Heart
Mountain Relocation Center9 a “concentration camp” typically make clear
that they are not trying to invoke Nazism. They emphasize that the problem
is one of semantic change over time, with the connotation of “death camp”
replacing the original meaning of the term “concentration camp” as the world
came to understand the horrors of Auschwitz.
These arguments about changed meaning have successfully resolved the
conflict over the term “concentration camp.” But they have had an
unfortunate side-effect. They have masked the important fact that in the early
1940s there actually was a civil rights discourse that dared to compare
American policies towards Japanese Americans with Germany’s
contemporaneous policies towards Jews. In judicial filings and in newspapers
between 1942 and 1945, critics and observers of the mass removal and
imprisonment of Japanese Americans invoked the tactics of the Nazis and the
deprivations visited on German Jews. Not surprisingly, this rhetorical
strategy ruffled official feathers, and did so even though the horrors of
Auschwitz were not yet widely known.
This essay unearths the analogies to Nazi policies that advocates for
Japanese American civil rights deployed even while the Nazi depredations
were ongoing. It shows that what we now call the Holocaust was the stuff of
civil rights conversation in the United States, not just years after the
Holocaust ended but while it was happening. It also shows that Nazi policies
7

The “assembly centers” were the temporary camps in which Japanese Americans were
placed for the summer of 1942; the “relocation centers” were the permanent camps to which
they were removed in the late summer of 1942.
8

Manzanar, located in California’s Owens Valley, housed some 10,000 Japanese Americans
between
1942
and
1945.
See
Manzanar,
DENSHO
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://encyclopedia.densho.org/Manzanar/.
9

Heart Mountain, located in northwest Wyoming, housed some 10,000 Japanese Americans
between 1942 and 1945.
See Heart Mountain, DENSHO ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://encyclopedia.densho.org/Heart%20Mountain.
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and practices served as a touchstone for public discussion of the civil rights
of Asian Americans, and not just African Americans. And in doing these
things, it sheds new light on an enduring exceptionalism in America’s
understanding of its own civil rights history, one that insists the nation is
immune from the repressive ills that afflict other countries.
I. THE PERSISTENT “CONCENTRATION CAMP” DEBATE
On February 19, 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt set aside Justice
Department objections and signed an executive order giving the military the
power to uproot any person from zones it might create in the United States.10
The military designated the entire West Coast as such a zone and removed
every person of Japanese ancestry, citizens and noncitizens alike.11 A premise
of racial disloyalty underlay the decision.12 It is no longer seriously contended
that this move was a military necessity. Rather, racism and war hysteria were
the grounding for the whole program of mass curfew, removal, and
detention.13
Without charges, proof, or hearings, some 120,000 people lost most of
their worldly goods to forced sale or abandonment and spent upwards of three
years in barbed wire enclosures the government euphemistically called
“assembly” and “relocation” centers.14 While none of the camps saw the
cruelty and disregard for prisoners’ wellbeing that marked even the most
benign Nazi camp, they were uncomfortable, repressive confinement sites in

10

Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942), 3 C.F.R. § 1092 (Cum. Supp.
1943). On the Justice Department’s objections, see PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE
STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 51–62 (1983).
11

See JOHN DEWITT, FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST, 1942
15, 36 (1943), https://archive.org/details/japaneseevacuati00dewi/
12

In justifying the decision, Lieutenant General John DeWitt, the commander who ordered
it, asserted that “[t]he Japanese race is an enemy race.” Id. at 34.
13

This was the conclusion of a blue-ribbon panel appointed by the United States Congress
to investigate the episode and make recommendations about possible redress. See
COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL
JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT
OF CIVILIANS 18 (1997).
14

A comprehensive account is available in id. at 47–184.
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barren and desolate places.15 Japanese Americans lived lives of idleness and
often despair under the eyes of armed sentries in guard towers. Tens of
thousands of people shouldered the unjust stigma of guilt by ethnicity.
This enduring shame was among the factors that led most of those whom
the government had unjustly imprisoned to say little in the years after their
release about the places where they had been confined.16 When the former
prisoners referred to the sites at all, they simply called them “camp.”17 Their
community understood what “camp” was. No modifier—“concentration” or
any other—was needed.
In the ferment of the late 1960s, some in the Japanese American
community wanted to step out from under the shadow of stigma and shake
off the prevalent belief that their imprisonment had been a justified military
necessity rather than a racist injustice.18 One of their strategies was to reclaim
the historically authentic term “concentration camp” in speaking and writing
about their sites of confinement.19 This opened a controversy about
terminology that would flare up repeatedly for decades.
The first of these conflicts arose early in 1972. Two Japanese American
groups applied to the California State Parks and Recreation Department to
designate the site of the Manzanar Relocation Center as a state historic
landmark.20 They asked for the installation of a bronze plaque at the site
15

An outstanding visual depiction of one of the camps is the collection of photographs by
prisoner Bill Manbo in COLORS OF CONFINEMENT: RARE KODACHROME PHOTOGRAPHS OF
JAPANESE AMERICAN INCARCERATION IN WORLD WAR II (Eric L. Muller ed., 2012).
16

See Donna K. Nagata, Jackie H.J. Kim and Teresa U. Nguyen, Processing Cultural
Trauma: Intergenerational Effects of the Japanese American Incarceration, 71 J. SOC.
ISSUES 356, 360, 363, 365 (2015).
17

Sue Konitomo Embrey, From Manzanar to the Present: A Personal Journey, in LAST
WITNESS: REFLECTIONS ON THE WARTIME INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS 177
(Erica Harth ed., 2001).
18

See id. at 176.

19

See Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, Words Can Lie or Clarify: Terminology of the World War II
Incarceration of Japanese Americans, NAT’L PARK SERV. HISTORY ELECTRONIC LIBRARY
2–4 (2009), http://npshistory.com/publications/incarceration/words-can-lie-or-clarify.pdf.
20

ALICE YANG MURRAY, HISTORICAL MEMORIES OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT

AND THE STRUGGLE FOR REDRESS 268 (2008) (describing the conflict to designate Manzanar

as a state historic landmark).
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reciting that “[f]rom war hysteria, racism, and economic greed one hundred
ten thousand persons of Japanese ancestry were directed by Presidential
Order on February 19, 1942 to leave their homes and to relocate to America’s
concentration camps.”21 The State Advisory Committee to the Department of
Parks and Recreation approved the landmark designation but objected to the
language of the plaque—in particular, to the words “concentration camps.”22
According to Sue Konitomo Embrey, a leader of one of the Japanese
American groups seeking the designation, the advisory committee
maintained that the term “conjures up the horrible memories of Hitler and his
countrymen” and should “refer only to the camps in Europe.”23 The
committee counter-proposed language for the plaque that, among other
things, removed “racism” and “economic greed” entirely and replaced
“concentration camps” with “relocation centers,” the euphemism used by the
agency that ran the camps, the War Relocation Authority (WRA).24 This was
unacceptable to the Japanese American groups. Only in response to
intervention from state legislators did the Parks and Recreation Department
relent and agree to a compromise on the language.25 In 1973, the department
installed a plaque using both terms—“relocation centers” and “concentration
camps”—at Manzanar.26
Manzanar became the site of another skirmish in the “concentration
camp” battle in 1996, when the National Park Service began planning for

21

Id. at 268.

22

Id.

23

Sue Kunitomi Embrey, From Manzanar to the Present, in LAST WITNESSES: REFLECTIONS
(Erica Harth ed., 2003).

ON THE WARTIME INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS 167, 178
24

MURRAY, supra note 20, at 269.

25

Id. at 270, 273.

26

Id. at 275. The final language read as follows: “In the early part of World War II, 110,000
persons of Japanese ancestry were interned in relocation centers by Executive Order 9066,
issued on February 19, 1942. Manzanar, the first of ten such concentration camps, was
bounded by barbed wire and guard towers, confining 10,000 persons, the majority being
American citizens. May the injustices and humiliation suffered here as a result of hysteria,
racism, and economic exploitation never emerge again.” Id. at 274–75. Precisely the same
conflict arose a few years later at the site of the Tule Lake camp in far northern California,
with essentially the same resolution. See Charles Hillinger, What Makes a Concentration
Camp?, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1979.
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interpretive facilities there.27 Local residents flooded newspapers with letters
accusing the government of “America-bashing,”—so many letters on both
sides of the question that the local newspaper stopped printing them.28 Much
of the energy centered on the historical plaque placed in 1973 and its use of
the term “concentration camp.” Vandals hacked and stained the plaque and
ground off the first “c” in the term.29 A World War II veteran phoned the site
superintendent to inform him “that he had driven 200 miles to urinate on the
historical marker.”30
Perhaps the saddest of the disputes over the term “concentration camp”
arose two years later. National Park Service officials decided to bring to Ellis
Island an exhibit on Japanese American removal and imprisonment that the
Japanese American National Museum (JANM) in Los Angeles had created
and displayed for a year in the mid-1990s.31 The exhibit, entitled “America’s
Concentration Camps: Remembering the Japanese-American Experience,”
triggered no controversy in Los Angeles, but the reaction in New York in
1998 was more turbulent.32 Anticipating controversy, the superintendent of
the Ellis Island site wrote to the exhibit’s curators at JANM that “because
‘concentration camps’ today connotes death camps, the ‘very large Jewish
community’ in New York City ‘could be offended by or misunderstand’ the
title.”33 She followed that letter with another two weeks later in which she
explained that Ellis Island would not host the exhibit unless the words
“concentration camp” were removed from its title.34
The exhibit’s curators objected to this demand. “We need to call [the
camps] what they were,” the senior curator, Karen Ishizuka, was quoted as
27

See Martin Forstenzer, Bitter Feelings Still Run Deep at Camp, L. A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1996
at A3, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1996-04-04-mn-54883-story.html.
28

See id.

29

See id.

30

Id.

31

See Somini Sengupta, What Is a Concentration Camp? Ellis Island Exhibit Prompts a
Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/08/nyregion/whatis-a-concentration-camp-ellis-island-exhibit-prompts-a-debate.html.
32

See id.

33

Id.

34

See id.
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saying.35 While the exhibit betrayed “no intent to compare or mitigate the
absolute horror of the Holocaust,” the term “concentration camp” was
historically accurate and authentic.36 “This happens to be our experience,”
Ishizuka said, “and it is our responsibility to tell it the way we experienced
it.”37 Jewish voices then joined the debate. While not demanding the removal
of the term outright, the executive director of the American Jewish
Committee in New York opined that the title “dilutes what we have come to
understand as the meaning of concentration camps.”38 “Since the Second
World War,” he maintained, the term had “taken on a specificity and a new
level of meaning that deserves protection.”39
The issue was resolved only after a meeting between Jewish and
Japanese American groups produced a compromise.40 The term
“concentration camp” would remain in the exhibit’s title, but an explanatory
footnote would appear in the lobby of the exhibit and in its brochure that
disclaimed any analogy to the Nazi experience. A commentator in the New
York Times noted the sadness and complexity of the dispute, taking it as
evidence that “[o]ne by one, emotion-laden words that Jews have thought of
as special to them are slipping from their grasp.”41
And that was not the last battle. The controversy reared its head again in
2011, this time within the Japanese American community itself. The
disagreement was triggered by an effort by Japanese American scholars and
activists to persuade the leading Japanese American civil rights group, the
Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), to adopt a resolution endorsing
a number of replacements for World-War-II-era euphemisms as preferred
terms.42 Among the euphemisms to be replaced was “relocation center,” and
35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id. (internal quotations omitted).

39

Id.

40

See Somini Sengupta, Accord on Term “Concentration Camp,” N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1998, at B4.
41

Clyde Haberman, Defending Jews’ Lexicon of Anguish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1998, at B1.

42

See THE POWER OF WORDS HANDBOOK, JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS LEAGUE (2011),
https://jaclpowerofwords.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/draft-power-of-words-hanbook.pdf.
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one of its endorsed replacements was to be “American concentration
camp.”43 At a 2010 meeting, the JACL’s National Council approved the
resolution by an 80-2 vote,44 but that did not resolve the matter. The
community continued to debate the matter for two years, with some
expressing concern about possible insult to the Jewish community.45 It was
not until the JACL’s 2012 National Convention that the organization
managed a unanimous vote in support of the use of “concentration camp.”46
This historical sketch of the “concentration camp” controversy makes
clear that the contested term has touched deep feelings since the early
1970s.47 What might explain the persistence of this controversy about
language across some forty years?
For Japanese Americans, the renewed use of the term “concentration
camp” in the early 1970s was one rhetorical piece of a larger effort to educate
an ignorant public about the true injustices in the US government’s wartime
program. A common narrative at that time, much as it had been since the war,
was that the government relocated the ethnic Japanese population to inland
accommodations as a justified military necessity after the Japanese attack at

43

This proposal derived from the influential 2009 paper by Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, supra
note 19, at 12–13.
44

See POWER OF WORDS, supra note 42.

45

See, e.g., George Yoshinaga, Horse’s Mouth: The Richest Countries in the World, RAFU
SHIMPO (Sept. 16, 2010), https://web.archive.org/web/20160808024238/http://www.rafu
.com/2010/09/horse-5/. Also very helpful in characterizing the controversy is Edward
Schumacher-Matos and Lori Grisham, Opinion, Euphemisms, Concentration Camps and the
Japanese Internment, NPR PUB. EDITOR (updated Feb. 14, 2012, 1:35 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/ombudsman/2012/02/10/146691773/euphemismsconcentration-camps-and-the-japanese-internment.
46

See Andy Noguchi, JACL Ratifies Power of Words Handbook: What Are the Next Steps?
(July 15, 2012), http://blog.manzanarcommittee.org/2012/07/15/jacl-ratifies-power-ofwords-handbook-what-are-the-next-steps/.
47

See, e.g., Jan Cleveland, Area Man Remembers Manzanar, SAN BERNARDINO SUNTELEGRAM, Feb. 13, 1977, at A1; Dexter Waugh, Semantic Debate on War Camps, SAN
FRANCISCO EXAMINER, May 7, 1976, at 6; Ann Reed, History Board Rejects “Concentration
Camp,” SACRAMENTO BEE, May 7, 1976, at 28.
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Pearl Harbor.48 Particularly to a generation that had come of age during the
ferment of the 1960s civil rights movement and the inception of the field of
ethnic studies, this standard story was painfully ignorant of the truth of what
they and their parents and grandparents had endured. It was also a story told
by white rather than Japanese Americans. To restore the historically authentic
term “concentration camp” to the discourse was to assert Japanese American
agency in the telling of their story.
Restoring the term to the discourse also worked to undermine the
argument that the camps were justified and pleasant.49 Linguist Deborah
Schiffrin writes perceptively about this aspect of the rhetorical strategy. She
notes that decades after the war, the term “concentration camp” had become
embedded in a well-known story—the Holocaust—whose horror and
injustice nobody could contest.50 The firm entrenchment of the term in
“another’s story had some perceived or unperceived advantages” for those
working to establish the injustice of Japanese American removal and
imprisonment.51 “Using language that already had a place in a general
American national schema about a well-known historical tragedy,” Schiffrin
argues, supplied a point of reference, “compensat[ing] for Americans’
misinformation (or ignorance) of [the Japanese American] … tragedy by
lexically embedding” the Japanese American story “in a larger, more
familiar, symbolic domain.”52 John Modell, who in 1973 edited and
published the camp diary of Charles Kikuchi, an important resistance figure,

48

A 1967 public opinion poll revealed that almost one in two Californians continued to
approve of the wartime removal of Japanese Americans. See WILLIAM HOSOKAWA, NISEI:
THE QUIET AMERICANS 497 (1973).
49

The most prolific advocate of the position that the camps were justified and pleasant was
author Lillian Baker. See, e.g., LILLIAN BAKER, CONCENTRATION CAMP CONSPIRACY: A
SECOND PEARL HARBOR (1981). For a perspective on Baker’s claims, see David Ibata,
History Her Way, CHI. TRIBUNE (Dec. 23, 1993), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ctxpm-1993-12-23-9312230141-story.html; Robert Ito, Concentration Camp or Summer
Camp?,
MOTHER
JONES
(Sept.
15,
1998),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/09/concentration-camp-or-summer-camp/.
50

Deborah Schiffrin, Language and Public Memorial: ‘America’s Concentration Camps’,
12 DISCOURSE AND SOC. 505, 525 (2001).
51

Id.

52

Id.
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makes a similar point, but more bluntly. He admits that his subtitle for the
edited diary, “Chronicle from an American Concentration Camp,” was
“meant to shock.”53 This “shock” surely came, at least in part, from the term’s
Nazi connotation in the public mind.
The effort by and on behalf of Japanese Americans to reclaim the term
“concentration camp” touched a mounting anxiety among Jews. By 1998—
the time of the Ellis Island controversy—the Holocaust was already more
than fifty years in the past. The number of people able to speak of the episode
from personal memory was beginning to dwindle.54 Distress about the
disappearance of the Holocaust into the fog of history was palpable. President
Bill Clinton, speaking at a 50th anniversary commemoration of the Holocaust
in New York in 1995, noted that soon “the living memory of the Holocaust
w[ould] pass.”55 A newspaper article on that event reported that “[a]s they
face their own mortality, the biggest fear for many survivors is that their
memories will be buried with them.”56 In a similar vein, a letter to the editor
of the New York Times in 1997 emphasized the importance of filling an
endowed chair in Holocaust history at Harvard because “the window of
memory is closing rapidly[;] [t]he eyewitnesses are dying, and all attempts to
chronicle the survivors' experiences will not remove the march of time.”57
Pervasive news coverage of the genocides in Bosnia58 and Rwanda59 in the
mid-1990s surely did not ease Jewish fears. Not only were current events
proving that the Holocaust was failing as a lesson, but that it increasingly
risked becoming “just another genocide” rather than a singular event in
human history. Seen in this context, the hesitations of some Jews about
53

John Modell, Preface in THE KIKUCHI DIARY: CHRONICLE FROM AN AMERICAN
CONCENTRATION CAMP xi (John Modell ed., 1993).
54

Assuming many people might be able to remember things that happened when they were
five years old, the youngest survivor with articulable memories in 1998 would have been
about 60 years old.
55

Doreen Carvajal, Lighting Candles to Keep the Flame of the Holocaust Alive, N.Y. TIMES,
May 1, 1995 (internal quotation omitted).
56

Id.

57

Steven A. Ludsin, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1997.

58

See Mike O’Connor, One by One, Bosnia Tallies the Missing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1996,
at 5.
59

See Milton Leitenberg, Anatomy of a Massacre, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1994, at 15.
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Japanese Americans’ use of the term “concentration camp” should not be
surprising.
Neither should be the objections to the use of the term from non-Jewish
Americans more generally. Even in 1943, while World War II was still
raging, Arthur Koestler was able to perceive the stubborn refusal of
Americans to compare Allied and Axis racial policies. He saw Americans as
“liv[ing] in a climate of half-truths … fight[ing] against racialism” while
“racial discrimination is far from abolished in the Anglo-Saxon countries.”60
“[E]ven to mention these facts,” Koestler observed, “undeniable though they
are, has the effect of a provocation.”61 This resistance to analogy is surely
part of what explains the outrage when a scientist likens some American
practice of human research or genetic experimentation to Nazi eugenics or
experimentation,62 or when an historian compares American plantation
slavery to Nazi concentration camps.63 It helps explain why for some, the
term “concentration camp” should be off limits in narrating the wartime
experience of Japanese Americans.
As of 2021, the “concentration camp” debate stands largely settled in the
Japanese American, Jewish American, and scholarly communities. It is now
common to see and hear the term in discussions of the Japanese American
camps, and rare to see or hear an objection.64 But two terms of the settlement
are important. One is about clarity: Those who use the term “concentration
60

Arthur Koestler, We Need a Fraternity of Pessimists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1943.

61

Id.

62

See, e.g., William H. Warren, Is a Psychologist Always a Psychologist, Ethically? Some
Observations Through a Wide Lens, in ETHICAL PRACTICE IN PSYCHOLOGY: REFLECTIONS
FROM THE CREATORS OF THE APS CODE OF ETHICS 57 (Alfred Allan & Anthony Love eds.,
2010).
63

See KIRSTEN FERMAGLICH, AMERICAN DREAMS AND NAZI NIGHTMARES: EARLY
HOLOCAUST CONSCIOUSNESS AND LIBERAL AMERICA, 1957-1965 at 56 (2006).
64

It bears mentioning that controversy over the use of the term “concentration camp” in an
American context reared its head again—though not between Japanese and Jewish
Americans—in the context of the controversy over the Trump Administration’s detention of
migrants. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Ocasio-Cortez Calls Migrant Detention Centers
‘Concentration Camps,’ Eliciting Backlash, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/us/politics/ocasio-cortez-cheney-detentioncenters.html.
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camp” typically either insert the modifier “American” before it or otherwise
signal that they do not mean to compare a camp like Manzanar to a camp like
Auschwitz.65 The other is about the impact of changed meanings over time.
Those who use the term emphasize how the post-war public’s growing
understanding of the horrors of Auschwitz after the war changed the ordinary
meaning of “concentration camp” from its usage before and during the war,
making it synonymous with “death camp.” 66 The implication here is that the
term would not have been troubling or controversial before the shift in its
public meaning.
II. THE NAZI ANALOGY IN WARTIME DISCOURSE ON
JAPANESE AMERICAN RIGHTS
Backing away from an analogy to Nazi Germany has proved a successful
way to relieve tension over use of the term “concentration camp.” It has done
a disservice, though, to the history of American civil rights discourse.
Whatever trepidations we may feel today about comparing the American
treatment of Japanese Americans with the National Socialist government’s
treatment of German Jews, advocates for the rights of Japanese Americans
felt no such qualms in the 1940s. The truth is that the concurrent example of
Nazi Germany hung like a shadow over discussions of what the United States
government was doing to people of Japanese ancestry. It is important to
excavate this forgotten discourse from the historical record and document
both its pervasiveness and its capacity to unnerve those who defended the
government’s actions.
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On April 30, 1942, as the government was accelerating the mass removal
of Japanese Americans from their West Coast homes, a group called the “Post
War World Council” sent a letter on the subject to President Roosevelt.67 The
letter had some two hundred signatories, many of them quite prominent.68
The letter expressed the “deep desire” that the president rescind his executive
order “which is so at variance with democracy and the American tradition.”69
To this distinguished group the German example was plain. Enforcing the
executive order “on the Japanese alone,” the signatories asserted,
“approximates the totalitarian theory of justice practiced by the Nazis in their
treatment of the Jews.”70
Over a year later, in a very different setting, a WRA lawyer stationed at
the Heart Mountain Relocation Center in Wyoming wrote a letter to his boss
in Washington, DC.71 He had been trying to help a Heart Mountain inmate
hold on to some real property left in the hands of a real estate agency.72 The
lawyer could not even get the agency to respond to his letters. He was
indignant over what he saw as a shameless attempt to fleece the Japanese
American owner. “The methods being employed are so high-handed as to
indicate that the Jews in Germany had due process of law as compared to this
affair,” he wrote, comparing the situation to the so-called “aryanization” of
Jewish property in Nazi Germany.73
These two vignettes are revealing. They show that the depredations
visited on the Jews of Germany were anything but off-limits in discussions
and debates about the treatment of Japanese Americans in the United States.
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Rather, they were a point of analogy that struck many as obvious and that
many tried to use to rhetorical advantage.
Certainly, the most obvious point of comparison was between the Nazi
and American confinement sites. Writing to the Los Angeles Times in May of
1942, one A.E. Bruce scored the government for sending American citizens
of Japanese ancestry into camps while leaving citizens of German and Italian
ancestry at large. “[T]o have them herded into concentration camps and
surrounded by barbed wire savors all too much of the Gestapo,” he argued,
compromising “the very thing for which we claim to fight.”74 At a New York
meeting of the Post War World Council in June of 1942, C. Read Cary of the
American Friends Service Committee made a similar point. After describing
the conditions in the so-called “assembly centers” to which Japanese
Americans were being initially sent, Cary “said they differ only slightly from
the concentration camps abroad.”75 “We are doing exactly the same thing as
in Germany,” argued the Quaker leader.76 To much the same effect was the
assertion by Mitsuye Endo’s lawyers in a U.S. Supreme Court brief, that the
only modern parallels to the military’s power under Executive Order 9066
are “the concentration camps of Germany and Russia, into which are herded
all those who are persona non grata to Hitler or Stalin.”77
It was not only the fact of the camps that drew analogies to Nazism, but
also their rationales. One of the justifications that the U.S. government
offered for the mass incarceration of Japanese Americans was the supposed
need to protect them from vigilante violence.78 This was obviously pretextual,
as it would have been possible to beef up police protection for Japanese
Americans in their home communities rather than imprisoning them. Some,
however, pointed out a darker context for this so-called “protective custody.”
In a 1944 brief to the United States Supreme Court in a case challenging the
lawfulness of a Japanese American’s detention at the Topaz Relocation
Center in Utah, the American Civil Liberties Union argued that the

74

A.E. Bruce, Letter to the Editor, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1942, at A4.

75

Japanese Decries Mass Evacuation, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1942, at 8.

76

Id.

77

Brief for Appellant at 35–36, Endo v. Eisenhower, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (No. 70).

78

See IRONS, supra note 10, at 126.

108

THE NAZI ANALOGY
government’s theory was “the outrageous doctrine of ‘protective custody’
invented by the Nazis in their persecution of the Jews.”79 “It has no place in
American life,” the brief maintained.80
Advocates for Japanese Americans also often pointed out that both the
American and the German systems of oppression were grounded in similarly
mistaken and offensive understandings of race. In an amicus curiae brief in
the United States Supreme Court, the Northern California branch of the
ACLU argued that the government’s program “scatters, disinherits, and
deprives” its victims “of the privileges of national and of state citizenship
simply because their crime is that they are not of pure-blood white stock.”81
Was this not “akin,” the brief asked rhetorically, “to the legend of a Nordic
master-race utilized by Messrs. Hitler, Goering and Goebbels of Nazi illfame…?”82 Critics took the government to task for refusing to accept the
Japanese American community’s assertions of their loyalty to the United
States,83 an act they cast as “a vivid demonstration to the world that America
… could think of nothing better to do than to fall back upon the Nazi method
of dealing with people, on the basis of ancestry.”84 One amicus curiae brief
in the Supreme Court charged that by rejecting the idea of Japanese American
loyalty, the government was “imply[ing] the Nazi doctrine that race and
physical type determine loyalty and ‘ethnic affiliations.’”85
79
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Moreover, advocates noted that these mistaken views about race sprang
from the same kinds of illogical thinking in the United States and Germany.
“We talk a great deal about the irrationality and anti-intellectualism of the
Nazis and Fascists, or their appeal to violent prejudice and emotion instead
of to knowledge,” observed the Japanese American Citizens League in their
amicus curiae brief in Korematsu v. United States.86 But this was not just a
foreign phenomenon, according to the brief. “The Nazi pattern was never
better exemplified” than in the case of Japanese Americans, where “decisions
were made on misinformation, assumptions, prejudices, half-truths, when
excellent, scientifically accurate material was available.”87 It was this sort of
irrationality that led to the most absurd of the rationales the military offered
for deeming Japanese Americans a military threat: their law-abidingness. In
depicting the danger Japanese Americans posed to the West Coast, John
DeWitt, the general who ordered their removal, asserted in 1942 that the fact
that Japanese Americans had until then committed no acts of sabotage was “a
disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken.”88 Fred
Korematsu’s lawyers lampooned this position in their Supreme Court brief:
“We do not hesitate to state that never did a Nazi official in Germany draw
more unjust conclusions than General DeWitt who would punish these people
not for harboring dangerous thoughts but for thoughts he would impute to
them or project into their minds.”89
Critics of Japanese American removal and imprisonment also picked up
on certain similarities in the German political landscape that led to the
persecution of the Jews. One Supreme Court brief noted that, whereas “no
modern civilized country [would] dare[] to transport millions of its
inhabitants into exile” because of the “political repercussions” of doing so,
“[a]n unorganized minority is always the object of oppression.”90 “In
Germany it was Jews,” said the brief; “Here it is Americans whose ancestors
were Japanese subjects.”91 This observation led to another point of political
86
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comparison between the United States and Nazi Germany: both nations’
discriminatory programs effaced the distinction between aliens and citizens.
“In her hours of greatest travail and direst peril England interned alien
enemies but did not stoop to interning her own citizens who were of alien
enemy ancestry,” noted the Northern California branch of the American Civil
Liberties Union in its amicus curiae brief supporting Gordon Hirabayashi’s
challenge to the government’s program.92 “It was reserved for Nazi Germany
and her satellites to penalize their citizens whose ancestors were Jews.”93 The
brief added that it was “unbelievable” that the United States would wish to
imitate the vicious example of her enemies.94
Even high-ranking officials in the federal government saw and spoke
of parallels between the plight of Japanese Americans and the Jews of
Germany. In 1945, as Japanese Americans released from the camps began
making their way back to the West Coast communities from which they had
been removed, they encountered a wave of vigilante violence. In one
representative incident, a Japanese American who returned to his Newcastle,
California farm was greeted by a gang of armed men in cars who fired several
shots and tried to blow up a farm building with dynamite.95 The perpetrators
were acquitted by an all-white jury that summer after their lawyer argued to
the jurors that “this is a white man’s country; let’s keep it so.”96 By June of
1945, twenty shooting attacks and three arsons had been confirmed, as well
as many ominous and threatening visits.97 The violence led to condemnatory
editorials in national newspapers; the Washington Post opined in May of
1945 that Japanese Americans were being persecuted “in the same way and
for just the same reasons that prompted the Nazi persecution of racial
minorities.”98 The Post gave its readership a bit of a lecture, suggesting that
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“[w]hen we gape at German atrocities, we might cast a backward glance at
these atrocities of our own.”99
But this message was coming not just in newspaper editorials and citizen
letters. It was also coming from a member of the Cabinet—Secretary of the
Interior Harold L. Ickes. In a statement on May 13, 1945, Ickes denounced
what he called “planned terrorism” against Japanese Americans returning to
their homes.100 He made clear that this wave of vigilantism was not just
isolated assaults by private attackers, but a pattern enabled by “the absence
of vigorous local law enforcement.”101 Remarkably, Ickes invoked the
example of Germany, labelling the hooliganism as the work of a “lawless
minority” that “seems determined to employ ... Nazi-storm-trooper tactics
against loyal Japanese-Americans and law-abiding Japanese aliens.”102 This
was stern and even stunning rhetoric from a Cabinet-level official.
Justices on the United States Supreme Court did not shy away from the
analogy to Nazi Germany either. In Hirabayashi v. United States,103 the Court
unanimously concluded that the dusk-to-dawn curfew that the military
imposed in the spring of 1942 on Americans of Japanese (but not German or
Italian) ancestry did not violate the due process rights of Japanese
Americans.104 Justice Frank Murphy filed a concurring opinion to make clear
that he believed the curfew went “to the very brink of constitutional
power.”105 He noted that “[u]nder the curfew order … no less than 70,000
American citizens have been placed under a special ban and deprived of their
liberty because of their particular racial inheritance.”106 “In this sense,”
Murphy continued, “it bears a melancholy resemblance to the treatment
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accorded to members of the Jewish race in Germany and in other parts of
Europe.”107
Justice Owen Roberts drew the parallel a bit more indirectly a year later
when he dissented in Korematsu v. United States,108 in which a six-Justice
majority upheld the constitutionality of the mass removal of Japanese
Americans from the West Coast. Roberts characterized the military’s orders
governing the movements of Japanese Americans in March of 1942 as
“nothing but a cleverly devised trap to accomplish the real purpose of the
military authority, which was to lock him up in a concentration camp.”109 As
if to put a finer point on his use of that freighted term, Roberts addressed the
semantic issue directly. He acknowledged that the War Relocation Authority
designated its confinement sites as “relocation centers,” but in his view they
were “so-called” relocation centers, which was nothing but “a euphemism for
concentration camps.”110
This was more than the justices in the majority could bear. Justice Hugo
Black, writing the Court’s opinion, tried to refute Justice Roberts’s use of the
term “concentration camp” and the thinly veiled analogy it drew to Nazi
Germany. “It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment
of a citizen in a concentration camp solely because of his ancestry,” wrote
Justice Black.111 He responded to Justice Roberts directly: “[W]e deem it
unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all the ugly connotations
that term implies.”112 This was December of 1944, when the extent of the
horrors of the death camps was only beginning to filter into the public
consciousness,113 so the “ugly connotations” were plainly not the
connotations of a death camp.
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In fact, the American military had objected to the Nazi analogy earlier
and more forcefully. On September 17, 1942, the Chief of Staff to General
John DeWitt issued a policy statement about the use of military police at the
WRA’s ten brand-new camps.114 While focused on such crucial matters as
suppressing possible riots, controlling traffic into and out of the camps, and
inspecting all incoming and outgoing parcels and packages, the statement
paused to take up the matter of language. “The War Relocation Project area
. . . includes one or more ‘Relocation Centers,’” which, it noted, “are not
‘concentration camps . . . . The use of this term is considered
objectionable.”115 Thus, even in 1942, long before news of the then-unfolding
Nazi genocide had reached American shores,116 the analogy to Nazi Germany
was on the lips of those discussing and debating the American camps—and
offending those whom the analogy made uncomfortable.
III. THE HOLOCAUST, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
By now it should be clear that the détente reached over the
appropriateness of the term “concentration camp” for a place like Manzanar
is founded on errors. It remains unthinkable to some today to compare
American and German racial policies and persecutions,117 but it was not
year. See Germans Kill 346 of 350 Women in Auswitz Concentration Camp, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 1944, at 30.
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unthinkable to those who lived while they were ongoing. Not only was it
thinkable, but it was a common rhetorical strategy.118 Neither is it true that
the horrors of the death camps are what rendered the Nazi analogy
discomfiting. Designers of U.S. government policy found the analogy
objectionable as early as September of 1942, long before Americans knew of
the death camps that had started operating earlier that year.119
Documenting this link informs us about more than just the propriety of
the usage of a term; it tells us several broader things about the Holocaust and
American civil rights discourse. The first may be the most obvious: The
analogy to Nazism played a role in the critique of American racial policies
not only in retrospect but in the moment. Because we commonly think of the
transformative civil rights advocacy in America as occurring in the 1950s and
especially the 1960s, it is tempting to assume that the Holocaust entered the
vocabulary of civil rights only in those decades, as in 1958 when Martin
Luther King, Jr., told an American Jewish group that “[t]here are Hitlers loose
in America today, both in high and low places,” who would join “history[‘s]
scapegoats, the Jews,” with “new scapegoats, the Negroes.”120
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Plainly, however, the Nazi analogy did not emerge in civil rights
discourse only with the benefit of hindsight. Within weeks of the
announcement of the government’s plans for Japanese Americans, prominent
and articulate critics publicly compared the mass eviction and confinement
of Japanese Americans to the persecution of the Jews then ongoing in Europe.
Litigators in the United States Supreme Court sought to leverage the stillunfolding Nazi policies towards the Jews as arguments against American
policies towards Japanese Americans. The Holocaust thus entered American
civil rights argument earlier than we might suppose.
The rhetoric documented in this essay adds to our understanding of the
Holocaust’s place in American civil rights history in a second way. Scholars
have long noted that civil rights discourse has unfolded in the United States
under the influence of a black/white paradigm, “the misleading notion that
the United States’ racial palette historically has contained only two
colors.”121 This paradigm was particularly dominant in mid-twentieth century
conversation about race and civil rights, a time after white ethnicities merged
into a unified category and Jim Crow was at its height.122 It was only late in
the century that “legal, demographic, and cultural changes challenged the …
legitimacy” of the paradigm.123
Now we can see that even at the time when civil rights discourse was
most pervasively understood as being about the rights of Black people, an
important strand of Holocaust-inflected civil rights argument focused on the
rights of Asian Americans rather than African Americans. This is a
significant reminder that conversations about racial discrimination in the
United States invoking analogies to Nazi Germany not only began before
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what we often think of as the beginning of the American civil rights
movement but strayed from the black/white paradigm of the day.
The Nazi analogy in civil rights talk about Japanese American removal
and imprisonment suggests one final thing to us, something about American
civil rights discourse more generally. Recall that the resolution of the
disagreement about proper use of the term “concentration camp” in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first century depended in part on an assumption
about the passage of time: it was Auschwitz that made the comparison of
American to German policies objectionable. The evidence in this essay shows
that this was not quite so. From the very outset of the American program, a
comparison to Nazi Germany was distasteful to some in the United States
even though the death camps were then unknown. The term “concentration
camp” rankled the U.S. military as early as 1942, when it carried no
connotation of industrialized mass murder. Justices of the United States
Supreme Court took offense at the perception of a “melancholy resemblance”
between the treatment of the ethnic Japanese in the United States and the
treatment of Jews in Germany in 1944, before they knew of the routine
extinctions carried out at Auschwitz.
What explains this resistance to the analogy? Part of the explanation
undoubtedly lies in important differences between the language Americans
and Germans used to present their policies and the brutality of their
implementation. From the moment the Nazis took power in January of 1933,
the Party and the government spoke of Jews with a menacing contempt never
seen in official American discourse.124 As well, by the time of the
Kristallnacht pogroms in 1938, it was clear that the Nazis were implementing
their policies of segregation and exclusion with a kind of cruelty that
American officials never used.125 For these reasons, loose comparisons to
Nazi Germany understandably rankled, and still do.
But the comparisons documented in this essay were not especially loose.
They zeroed in on specific features of American policy for analogy to
comparable German policies. They saw the principle of “protective custody”

124

See Engelbert Huber, The Anti-Semitism of the NSDAP, in THE THIRD REICH
SOURCEBOOK 320 (Anson Rabinbach & Sander L. Gilman, eds., 2013).
125

See id. at 338–39.

117

NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

1:94

2021

on both sides. They found similarity in the theories of biological racism. They
noted the political ease of mistreating small and powerless minorities. They
saw connections between the fleecing of assets of both Jews and Japanese
Americans. And yes, they looked at the bleak landscapes, the rows of
barracks, the barbed wire and guard towers and search lights, the patrolling
sentries, and they saw concentration camps.
To refuse to acknowledge these substantial similarities, in the midst of
differences, is to practice a form of self-deception—one that rejects the very
idea that the United States has the capacity for the sort of injustice it readily
condemns in other nations. It was an understandable tendency during World
War II and the Cold War that followed it. These were eras in which it was
politically and culturally imperative for the United States to distinguish itself
from first its fascist and then its communist enemies. This meant crafting and
polishing a narrative of exemplary American racial progress that left no room
for unflattering comparisons to repressive racial policies abroad. 126 It also
may be an artifact of a more enduring American exceptionalism on matters
of civil and human rights, one grounded in “the notion that America's
canonical commitments to liberty, equality, individualism, populism, and
laissez-faire somehow exempt it from the historical forces that have led to the
corruption of other societies.”127 On this view, any stain on the American
civil rights record will seem but a blemish alongside the truly malign
practices of nations that lack the distinctive commitment to justice of the
shining American city on the hill.
For a brief moment, a more honest look inward seemed possible. Kerstin
Fermaglich has documented how, in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, Nazi
Germany became a lens through which Americans allowed themselves to
look critically at their own society.128 The concentration camp became a
legitimate (if hotly contested) analogy for the slave plantation in the work of
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Stanley Elkins129 and the American home in the work of Betty Friedan;130
Stanley Milgram’s famous electroshock experiments revealed a bit of the
concentration camp guard in the American Everyman.131 That window closed
later in the 1960s and remained tightly shut in the decades that followed, as
Nazi Germany came to be seen as a singular, analogy-defying regime in the
history of human evil.132
Jewish and Japanese Americans were able to settle the debate over the
term “concentration camp” only by agreeing that the window should remain
closed. Analysis of the wartime civil rights of Japanese Americans more
generally has had to proceed under the assumption of an exceptional
America. The result is an impoverished historical account that flinches from
comparisons that the historical actors themselves were not afraid to draw.
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